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CIVIL PROCEDURE:  DISMISSAL 
 
Summary 
 
The Nevada Court of Appeals considered a consolidated appeal from a final district 
court order dismissing appellant’s complaint with prejudice for a want of prosecution and 
a post judgment order awarding attorney fees and costs.  The Court of Appeals determined 
the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action without prejudice, reversed 
the district court’s dismissal, vacated its award of fees and costs, and remanded. 
 
Background 
 
Appellant Richard Hunter acquired land in 1980 and sought his neighbor’s 
permission to build a berm on her property to prevent flooding caused by water run-off 
from adjoining land.  After receiving permission, Hunter built the berm in 1983 and asserts 
he subsequently maintained it.  In 2002, Respondent William Gang acquired the same 
adjoining property. 
 
 But in 2009, Hunter unsuccessfully attempted to sell his property, purportedly 
because of the potential buyer’s concerns regarding encroachments on Gang’s property, 
including the berm.  Hunter brought suit asserting claims to quiet title, adverse possession, 
and sought injunctive as well as declaratory relief over the portion of Gang’s property 
where Hunter built the berm.  After negotiations purportedly broke down, Gang asserted 
he still continued to send settlement correspondence to Hunter and Hunter’s counsel, which 
were ignored.  
 
In response, Gang moved to dismiss Hunter’s action with prejudice for want of 
prosecution 20 months after Hunter filed his complaint.  Gang’s motion to dismiss cited 
the Court’s express authority under NRCP 41(e) to dismiss an action a plaintiff has not 
brought to trial within two years as well as cases discussing the Court’s inherent authority 
to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. Hunter claimed dismissal was premature, 
arguing the two-year time period in NRCP 41(e) had not yet passed and alternatively 
argued his ill health should excuse any delay.  The district court ultimately granted Gang's 
motion to dismiss with prejudice, and Hunter appealed the dismissal.  Gang also moved for 
attorney fees and costs, pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) and NRS 18.020, which the district 
court granted in full.  Hunter then appealed from that order; the two appeals were 
subsequently consolidated.  
 
Discussion 
 
Dismissal for want of prosecution 
District courts in Nevada have two independent sources of authority to dismiss an 
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action for want of prosecution:  1)  express authority under NRCP 41(e), permitting 
dismissal where the plaintiff fails to bring an action to trial within two years after the action 
is filed and requiring dismissal if the plaintiff does not bring the action to trial within five 
years, 2)  inherent authority to dismiss an action for want of prosecution, “independent of 
any authority granted under statutes or court rules."2  Since the district court dismissed this 
action before the NRCP 41(e) two-year time period elapsed, it must have dismissed 
Hunter's action using its inherent authority, which district courts may appropriately evoke 
without having to justify its use.  However, a court’s inherent authority must be exercised 
with restraint and discretion; such authority should be exercised sparingly.3   
Abuse of Discretion 
But a district court’s decision to dismiss an action for want of prosecution will be 
disturbed on appeal only if the district court “grossly abused its discretion.” 4  Importantly, 
a lack of due diligence on the part of the plaintiff individually, or through counsel, is an 
essential element to justify dismissal for failure to prosecute.5  Further, where—like here—
a district court seeks to dismiss with prejudice,  “its use must be tempered by a careful 
exercise of judicial discretion,” because it is a “harsh remedy” to be used only in “extreme 
situations.”6  Accordingly, when evoking this remedy, district courts must take into account 
additional factors, other than lack of diligence.  
Dismissal with prejudice pursuant to inherent authority 
While the Nevada Supreme Court has not yet decided what circumstances allow 
district courts to dismiss cases with prejudice pursuant to their inherent authority, it has 
identified several factors for district courts to consider when deciding whether to dismiss 
cases with prejudice under its express authority with regard to the the five-year provision 
of NRCP 41(e)—the Monroe factors7.  These factors include the following:  1)  the 
underlying conduct of the parties, 2) whether the plaintiff offers adequate excuse for the 
delay, 3) whether the plaintiff’s case lacks merit, and 4) whether any subsequent action 
following dismissal would not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.8 
 
Here, the Nevada Court of Appeals decided to adopt the same Monroe factor test 
for district courts to consider in dismissing an action with prejudice under its inherent 
authority.  The Court held that district courts should consider the four Monroe elements in 
addition to any other relevant considerations such as length and reasonableness of the 
delay. 
 
                                                     
2  Moore v. Cherry, 90 Nev. 390, 393, 528 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1974)   
3  Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); See United States u. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 
461 (4th Cir. 1993) 
4  Moore, 90 Nev. at 395, 528 P.2d at 1021  
5  Id. 
6  Id. at 394, 528 P.2d at 1021; Id. at 393, 528 P.2d at 1021  
7  Monroe v. Columbia Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 123 Nev. 96, 103, 158 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2007)  
8  Id. 
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The District Court’s findings of fact 
 On review of the record, the Nevada Court of Appeals concluded that evidence did 
not support nearly all the court’s factual findings and that no evidence was presented to 
sustain the court’s conclusions that Hunter failed to timely prosecute his case and that 
Hunter's claims lacked merit.  
The Monroe factors in Hunter’s action 
 The Court looked to the Monroe factors to determine whether the district court 
abused its discretion by dismissing Hunter’s claim for want of prosecution.  In considering 
the conduct of the parties, the Court considered whether the parties behaved in accordance 
with a reasonable and good faith belief that no court action was necessary.9  Because both 
parties—Hunter and Gang—failed to take court action, their conduct suggested settlement 
negotiations were ongoing.  Consequently, this factor supported a determination that 
dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of the district court’s discretion. 
 
Noting that Hunter’s wife’s affidavit discussing his illness was vague and 
inconclusive, the Court held there was sufficient evidence supporting the district court’s 
finding that Hunter’s illness was inadequate to excuse the 20-month period in which he 
failed to take court action.  The Court also noted Hunter’s illness, even if adequate, would 
not necessarily extend to his attorney, who could have acted diligently by contacting 
opposing counsel or undertaking other legal remedies.  However, the Court emphasized 
that a plaintiff’s prolonged illness could be an adequate excuse for delay in prosecution 
under the right circumstances.10 
 
Also, the district court inappropriately based its conclusion that Hunter’s claims 
lacked merit on Gang’s unsupported allegations of Hunter’s manipulative behavior as well 
as Hunter’s complaint and Hunter’s wife’s affidavit—neither of which, the Court of 
Appeals determined, could be viewed as sufficient and substantial evidence.  Thus this 
factor, too, suggests dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.   
 
Since neither the parties’ briefs nor the record include any information about 
statutes of limitations applicable to Hunter’s claims, the Court of Appeals refused to assess 
whether Statutes of Limitations issues would have served as basis for dismissal with 
prejudice. 
 
Conclusion 
The Nevada Court of Appeals found that the district court abused its discretion by 
dismissing the claims with prejudice, because the majority of the district court’s factual 
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10  See In re McGregor, 56 Nev. 407, 411, 48 P.2d 418, 420 (1935) (Where illness of both plaintiff and wife 
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and legal conclusions were unsupported by the record, and the evidence presented did not 
support dismissal with prejudice.  Pursuant to the Monroe factors, the conduct of the parties 
and merits of the action weighed against dismissal with prejudice.  Accordingly, the district 
court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice is reversed, its order of attorneys fees and costs 
based on dismissal vacated, and the matter remanded to district court. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
